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1 Introduction
The uncertainty of the business environment is increasing more and more. Firms' managers
face complex business environments and the diculty of predicting likely future outcomes. How
they treat uncertainty is important in business decision making, such as the growth of a cap-
ital investment. In this paper, we consider a rm's investment problem under uncertainty. In
particular, we focus on a certain type of uncertainty to incorporate the unpredictable business
environment. We consider the rm's investment problem under ambiguity, which is also termed
Knightian uncertainty. The probability of an outcome is not uniquely determined under am-
biguity or Knightian uncertainty $($Knight, 1921 $)^{}$ . A number of papers study decision making
under ambiguity (Camerer and Weber, 1992; Etner et. al., 2012; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2013).
Suppose that a rm produces a single output and sells it in a market. The rm's problem
is to decide the production capital investment rate to maximize its prot as in Abel and Eberly
(1997). Investing in the capital requires a quadratic-type adjustment cost in addition to the
purchase price, which is assumed to be constant. In this paper, we consider the case in which
the rm's manager cannot predict the future price of the output precisely. To be more precise,
he cannot uniquely identify the probability distribution of the output price. Then, he has to
determine the investment strategy under output price ambiguity. In Abel and Eberly (1997),
the rm's manager can uniquely identify the distribution of the output price. This paper is an
extension of the research of Abel and Eberly (1997) by incorporating ambiguity. In order to
reect the misspecication of the model, we use robust control techniques developed by Hansen
and Sargent (2001), Hansen et al. (2002), and Hansen et al. (2006). These techniques are based
on the multiple priors framework by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). We formulate the rm's
problem as a robust control problem and show that the equation derives the optimal investment
strategy.
This paper is also related to Tsujimura $(2014, 2015)$ . These papers examined investment
problems under ambiguity in a two-period setting as in Miao (2004), which investigates optimal
consumption under ambiguity. Tsujimura (2015) examines the pollutant abatement investment
in a production economy by including investments in pollutant abatement capital into Tsujimura
(2014), which examines capital investment.
'This research was supported in part by a Grant-in-Aid for Scientic Research $(No. 15K01213)$ from the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science.
lForty years later, in 1961, Ellsberg showed that decision-makers are not always able to derive a unique
probability distribution (Ellsberg, 1961). Since Ellsberg's seminal paper, uncertain environments have become
better known as being ambiguous.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setup of the rm's
investment problem. In Section 3, we solve the rm's problem. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
In this section, we set up a rm's investment problem. Suppose that a rm produces a single
output by using capital $K_{t}$ and labor $L_{t}$ and sells it in a market. The rm's production function
$F(L_{t}, K_{t})$ takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
$F(L_{t}, K_{t})=L_{t}^{\gamma}K_{t}^{1-\gamma}$ , (2.1)
where $\gamma\in(0,1)$ is the output elasticity of labor. The dynamics of the capital $K_{t}$ is governed
by:
$dK_{t}=(I_{t}-\delta K_{t})dt, K_{0}=k$ , (2.2)
where $I_{t}$ is the investment rate at time $t$ and $\delta\in(0,1)$ is the depreciation rate. When the rm
invests in capital, it incurs the cost $C(I_{t})$ :
$C(I_{t})=c_{0}I_{t}+ \frac{1}{2}c_{1}I_{t}^{2}$ , (2.3)
where $c_{0}>0$ is the price of purchasing capital and $c_{1}>0$ is the quadratic adjustment cost
parameter2. $c_{0}$ and $c_{1}$ are assumed to be constant. The output price, $P_{t}$ , is governed by the
following stochastic dierential equation:
$dP_{t}=\mu P_{t}dt+\sigma P_{t}dW_{t}, P_{0}=p>0$ , (2.4)
where $\mu>0$ and $\sigma>0$ are constants. $W_{t}$ is a standard Brownian motion on a ltered probability
space $(\Omega, \mathcal{F}, \mathbb{P}, \{\mathcal{F}_{t}\}_{t\geq 0})$ , where $\mathcal{F}_{t}$ is generated by $W_{t}.$
In this paper, we consider the case in which the rm's manager does not have perfect con-
dence about the distribution of the output price. He is concerned about the robustness of
his decisions to misspecication of the model. Then, he considers a set of possible probability
measures, $\mathcal{P}$ , on $(\Omega, \mathcal{F})$ . The size of $\mathcal{P}$ is determined by a relative entropy3. Every element in
$\mathcal{P}$ is equivalent to $\mathbb{P}$ . Let $\mathbb{Q}\in \mathcal{P}$ be the distorted measure chosen by the rm's manager. Then,
the measure $\mathbb{P}$ is replaced by the probability measure $\mathbb{Q}.$
As in Kleshchelski and Vincent (2007), we derive the output price process under the prob-
ability measure $\mathbb{Q}$ . Let $h_{t}$ be the measurable drift distortion and assume that $\int_{0}^{\infty}h_{s}^{2}ds<\infty,$
$h\in \mathcal{H}$ , where $\mathcal{H}$ is the set of all $h$ such that the process $\xi^{\mathbb{Q}}$ is dened by:
$\xi_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}=\exp\{\int_{0}^{t}h_{s}dW_{s}-\frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{t}h_{s}^{2}ds\}$ . (2.5)
$\xi^{\mathbb{Q}}$ is a $\mathbb{P}$-martingale. The drift distortion $h$ denes the probability measure $\mathbb{Q}\in \mathcal{P}.$ $\xi^{\mathbb{Q}}$ is also
the Radon-Nikodym derivative of $\mathbb{Q}$ with respect to $\mathbb{P}$ :
$\xi_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}=\mathbb{E}[\frac{d\mathbb{Q}}{d\mathbb{P}}]$ (2.6)
2In Abel and Eberly (1997), the cost function is formulated as $C(I)=c_{0}+c_{1}I^{n},$ $n=\{2$ , 4, 6, $\}.$
3This is also termed the Kullback-Leibler divergence.
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By Girsanov's theorem, for all $h\in \mathcal{H}$ a Brownian motion $W_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}$ under $\mathbb{Q}$ is given by:
$W_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}=W_{t}- \int_{0}^{t}h_{s}ds$ , (2.7)
From (2.5) and (2.7) we obtain that:
$\xi_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}=\exp\{\int_{0}^{t}h_{s}dW_{s}^{\mathbb{Q}}+\frac{1}{2}\int_{0}^{t}h_{s}^{2}ds\}$ . (2.8)
Then, the output price dynamics under the probability $\mathbb{Q}$ is given by:
$dP_{t}=(\mu+\sigma h_{t})P_{t}dt+\sigma P_{t}dW_{t}^{\mathbb{Q}}, P_{0}=p>0$ , (2.9)
As in Hansen et al. (2002), Skiadas (2003), and Hansen et al. (2006), the dierence between $\mathbb{P}$




The rm's operating prot at $t$ is given by:
$P_{t}F(L_{t}, K_{t})-wL_{t}$ , (2.11)
where $w>0$ is a constant wage. Labor is assumed to be costlessly and instantaneously adjusted.
Then, the rm's maximized instantaneous operating prot at $t,$ $\pi(K_{t}, P_{t})$ , is calculated as:
$\pi(K_{t}, P_{t})=\eta P_{t}^{\alpha}K_{t}$ , (2.12)
where $\alpha=1/(1-\gamma)>1$ and $\eta=\alpha^{-\alpha}(\alpha-1)^{\alpha-1}w^{1-\alpha}>0.$
Therefore, the rm's problem is to choose the investment rate at each time so as to maximize
the expected $rm^{\rangle}s$ net prot even though the worst possible drift distortion $h$ occurs and is
formulated as the multiplier robust control $mode1^{5}$ :
$V(k,p)= \max\min_{\mathbb{Q}\{I_{t}\}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}[\pi(K_{t}, X_{t})-C(I_{t})]dt+\theta R(\mathbb{Q})]$ , (2.13)
where $\theta\geq 0$ is the multiplier on the relative entropy penalty. $\theta$ can measure how much the
rm's manager weights the possibility of $\mathbb{P}$ not being the correct distribution. That is, $\theta$ implies
the $rm^{)}s$ manager's sensitivity to ambiguity. A lower value of $\theta$ means the manager is more
$4See$ also Funke and Paetz (2011) for the relationship between $\mathbb{P}$ and $\mathbb{Q}$ in Hansen-Sargent robust control
techniques
5The rm's problem can be also written as the constraint robust control model:
$V(k,p)= \max_{\{I_{t}\}}\min_{\mathbb{Q}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}[\pi(K_{t},X_{t})-C(I_{t})]dt],$
s.t. $R(\mathbb{Q})\leq\zeta,$
where $\zeta$ is the maximum specication error that the rm's manager is willing to accept. See Hansen et al. (2002)
for more detail.
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fearful of model misspecication. So he chooses $\mathbb{Q}$ further away from $\mathbb{P}$ in the relative entropy
sense, that is, the size of $\mathcal{P}$ increases as $\theta$ decreases.
Combining (2.10) and (2.13) the rm's problem can be written as:
$V(k,p)= \max_{\{I_{t}\}}\min_{\{h_{t}\}\in \mathcal{H}}\mathbb{E}_{\mathbb{Q}}[\int_{0}^{\infty}e^{-rt}[\eta P_{t}^{\alpha}K_{t}-(c_{0}I_{t}+\frac{1}{2}c_{1}I_{t}^{2})+\theta\frac{h_{t}^{2}}{2}]dt]$ . (2.14)
3 Optimal Capital Investment
In this section, we solve the rm's problem (2.14) and derive the optimal capital investment
strategy.
It follows from the Bellman-Isaacs condition that the value function of the rm's problem
(2.14) satises:
$rV(k,p; \theta)=\max_{I}\min_{h}[(\eta p^{\alpha}k-(c_{0}I+\frac{1}{2}c_{1}I^{2})+\theta\frac{h^{2}}{2})$
$+(I- \delta k)V_{k}(k,p;\theta)+(\mu+\sigma h)pV_{p}(k,p;\theta)+\sigma^{2}p^{2}\frac{1}{2}V_{pp}(k,p;\theta)]$ .
(3.1)
See Fleming and Souganidis (1989) and Hansen et al. (2002) for more detail. The rst-order
conditions for $I$ and $h$ are:
$I= \frac{1}{c_{1}}(V_{k}-c_{0})$ , (3.2)
$h=- \frac{\sigma pV_{p}}{\theta}$ . (3.3)
It follows from (3.3) that $h$ goes to $0$ as $\theta$ goes to $\infty$ . This implies that the $rm^{\rangle}s$ manager acts
as if he knows the model with certainty and there are no robustness concerns, when $\theta$ goes to
$\infty$ (Roseta-Palma and Xepapadeas, 2004).
As in Abel and Eberly (1997) and Chang (2004, \S 5.3), we assume that the value function is
a linear function of the capital. Then, a guess solution to (3.1) is formulated as:
$V(k,p)=G(p)k+H(p)$ . (3.4)
The guess solution implies that the expected rm's value is the sum of the expected value of the
existing capital, $G(p)k$ and the expected value of the newly invested capital, $H(p)$ . Note that
the shadow price of the capital $V_{k}(k, p)$ is equal to $G(p)$
Substituting (3.4) into (3.1), we obtain that:
$rG(p)k+rH(p)= \eta p^{\alpha}k-(c_{0}I+\frac{1}{2}c_{1}I^{2})+\theta\frac{h^{2}}{2}+IG(p)-\delta kG(p)$
(3.5)
$+( \mu+\sigma h)pG'(p)k+(\mu+\sigma h)pH'(p)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}p^{2}G"(p)k+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}p^{2}H"(p)$ .
Separating (3.5) into the terms with $k$ and the terms without $k$ , we obtain the following two
dierential equations:
$\eta p^{\alpha}-(r+\delta)G(p)+(\mu+\sigma h)pG'(p)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}p^{2}G"(p)=0$ , (3.6)
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$IG(p)-(c_{0}I+ \frac{1}{2}c_{1}I^{2})+\theta\frac{h^{2}}{2}-rH(p)+(\mu+\sigma h)pH'(p)+\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}p^{2}H"(p)=0.$ (3.7)
A general solution to (3.6) is given by:
$G(p)=A_{1}p^{\beta_{1}}+A_{2}p^{\beta_{2}}+B\eta p^{\alpha}$ . (3.8)
The rst two terms of the right-hand side are solutions to the homogeneous part of (3.6). We
set $A_{1}=A_{2}=0$ to rule out bubbles on the shadow price of installed capital. Then, the general
solution is reduced to the particular solution:
$G(p)=B\eta p^{\alpha}$ . (3.9)
Substituting (3.9) into (3.6) yields:
$B=[(r+ \delta)+(\mu+\sigma h)\alpha-\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}\alpha(\alpha-1)]^{-1}$ (3.10)
It follows from $B>0$ that we obtain:
$r+ \delta>\frac{1}{2}\sigma^{2}\alpha(\alpha-1)-(\mu+\sigma h)\alpha$ (3.11)
From (3.2) and (3.4), we obtain:
$I= \frac{1}{c_{1}}(G(p)-c_{0})$ (3.12)




The optimal investment rate is derived from the nonlinear dierential equation (3.13).
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze capital investment strategy with the quadratic adjustment cost when
the rm faced output price ambiguity. We obtain the dierential equation, which derives the op-
timal investment strategy. Because the dierential equation is nonlinear, it is solved numerically.
We leave the numerical calculation for future work.
There are several ways to extend this paper. We could consider the rm's attitude to risk
by using utility function as in Sandmo (1971). We also could investigate a social welfare by
considering a production economy as in Tsujimura (2015). Furthermore, we could incorporate
technological progress as well. These important topics are left to future research.
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